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Richard J Epstein1* and Stephen D Epstein2Abstract
Background: Traditional top-down national regulation of internationally mobile doctors and nurses is fast being
rendered obsolete by the speed of globalisation and digitisation. Here we propose a bottom-up system in
which responsibility for hiring and accrediting overseas staff begins to be shared by medical employers, managers,
and insurers.
Discussion: In this model, professional Boards would retain authority for disciplinary proceedings in response to
local complaints, but would lose their present power of veto over foreign practitioners recruited by employers who
have independently evaluated and approved such candidates' ability. Evaluations of this kind could be facilitated by
globally accessible National Registers of professional work and conduct. A decentralised system of this kind could
also dispense with time-consuming national oversight of continuing professional education and license revalidation,
which tasks could be replaced over time by tighter institutional audit supported by stronger powers to terminate
underperforming employees.
Summary: Market forces based on the reputation (and, hence, financial and political viability) of employers and
institutions could continue to ensure patient safety in the future, while at the same time improving both national
system efficiency and international professional mobility.
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Rates of international medical migration have risen
sharply in recent decades, creating new debates over
professional opportunity and fairness [1,2]. These
debates have in turn raised questions as to the utility of
current professional regulatory systems, which have
evolved at a relatively slow pace over the last three centur-
ies [3]. The key challenge for any such regulatory system
has always been that of protecting the public from the
exaggerated claims of mere ‘druggists’ and ‘apothecaries’
[4] whilst also preventing exploitation, albeit inadvertent,
by professional organisations - including those administra-
tive bodies entrusted with regulatory powers [5]. With re-
spect to such regulatory bodies, one factor predisposing to* Correspondence: repstein@stvincents.com.au
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumexploitation in the modern age is the substantial income
receivable which, once entrenched as a standard require-
ment, can easily become self-perpetuating. Indeed, annual
running costs for national regulatory offices may exceed
US$100m [6].
Predictably, national Councils empowered to control
physician/nurse licensing have become targets for criti-
cism themselves. The power of the media has ensured
that public perception of errors licensing foreign-trained
practitioners causes severe damage, contributing to a de-
fensive and inefficient regulatory culture [7,8]. It is
therefore not surprising that pent-up disillusion with
the global regulatory culture has begun to run deep in
some quarters:
The process is out of control, and quite uncaring.
(Medical Councils) are seemingly above the law, do
not observe ‘rules of evidence’, and are composed of
people who are not doctors (and hence) have no under-
standing. Many careers and lives have been blightedCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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institutional hypocrisy. Medical professionals are the
only group. . . who are assumed, often on the basis of
unsubstantiated complaints, to be guilty liars, and pre-
maturely punished [9].
In the light of such sentiments, we examine here the
development of today’s medical licensing systems, and
discuss factors implicating a need for urgent change.Globalisation vs. bureaucracy
Human society is changing faster than ever, driven by
revolutionary increases in personal mobility (globalisa-
tion) and information transfer (digitisation). This
abrupt transition to a flatter world has eroded the
once-impenetrable barriers defining nation-states [10]:
for example, English has become the undisputed
lingua franca of scientific communication [11], while
currencies and finance have become progressively
deregulated [12]. In the medical world, international
clinical services (‘medical tourism’) are now common-
place [13], north–south health dialogues are multiply-
ing [14], practice standards are converging to global
accreditation norms [15], while even the training of
junior doctors [16] and nurses [17] is venturing off-
shore. Partly as a result of such changes, the trad-
itional role of national agencies regulating the health
sector is receiving fresh scrutiny [18]. For example,
the medical licensing industry - which has long pro-
claimed patient safety as its sole raison d’être, but in
practice also protects the jobs of its local clinical and
administrative workforces - is now having to face such
reappraisals [19]. The emerging clash is a familiar one
of the new and the old: namely, in this context, the ir-
resistible force of globalisation versus the immovable
object of bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy is essential to developed societies, regulat-
ing as it does the complex activities of large populations.
Yet despite its virtues, bureaucracy is negatively identi-
fied with a proliferation of 'red tape’ by many audiences -
including younger people [20], businesses [21], and
academics [22] –and is often criticised by specific biomed-
ical sectors, such as those involving laboratory research
[23,24], clinical trials [25,26] and ethics committees
[27,28]. Indeed, some critics have even suggested the idea
of ‘making bureaucracy work’ to be oxymoronic [29].
Others have noted that bureaucratic cultures are inher-
ently fearful of debate and innovation, yet concede that
rapid change can eventually force adaptations [19]. In the
following sections we discuss the limitations of nation-
based systems for regulating medical migration in a newly
hypemobile world, and argue for a more flexible model in
which market forces contribute to the regulatory frame-
work (Figure 1).The Certificate of Good Standing: time to sit down
Historically, the model under which the professions
operated involved conferral of professional status upon a
practitioner following completion of a prescribed course
of study and practice. Once conferred, the assumption
was that professional status was indefinite; no assump-
tion was made that professional skills, once learned,
would atrophy, warranting removal of professional sta-
tus. Hence, the original role of the regulatory authorities
was itself regulated in terms of scope. This limited gov-
ernance model has since been subverted by inexorably
rising bureaucratic intrusion into issues of professional
competence, even though such encroachment into pro-
fessional spheres has seldom if ever been justified by em-
pirical evidence. On the other hand, any such expansion
of bureaucratic remit might well seem attractive to regu-
lators, given its implications for winning more public
funding and control.
Despite this recent expansion of regulatory authority
in most countries, Council-centric monopolies on med-
ical credentialing are now being pressured by an acceler-
ation of professional migration [30]. A linchpin of
international cross-credentialing in this context has been
the Certificate of Good Standing (CGS) or its local
equivalent, provision of which signifies ‘no complaints
received by the outgoing Board’. Being a complaints-
based system, individual practitioners usually have no
difficulty securing a CGS in the absence of a formal alle-
gation of misconduct against them, even if less formal
complaints have been trumpeted in the press or media.
Yet no CGS will be issued to any doctor against whom a
complaint is pending, regardless of expected delays in
considering the complaint - even if the complaint in
question is patently frivolous or vexatious, or if the com-
plaint is of a local nature that is irrelevant to the juris-
diction of the receiving Council. Indeed, if a complaint
has been received but not yet considered by a Council –
a process that may sometimes take months or even years
to complete – the only help that will be considered by
most Councils is to issue a so-called ‘Certificate of Stand-
ing’ which, by confirming that ‘Good Standing’ is not
awarded, effectively confirms ‘Bad Standing’ and
thus debars the practitioner - typically still licensed
and practising without constraint or stigma in his/her own
jurisdiction - from employment abroad. The justification
of 'defending the public interest’, as is customarily invoked
by regulators in this context, often exacts a heavy price on
the medical needs of patients and employers abroad, not
to mention the reputation and careers of practitioners
seeking to migrate - who, in the majority of cases, are ul-
timately cleared of wrongdoing [31]. The present CGS-
based system may thus offer the worst of both worlds: on
the one hand, it is a potential impediment to the global
mobility of well-qualified practitioners; while on the other,
Figure 1 Divergent models of regulating medical competence: performance-based (market-regulated) vs. rules-based
(top-down) systems. The market-based model, shown at left, proposes (i) to regulate medical workforce numbers through demand (i.e., the
effects of institutional reputation and performance management on attracting patients, as shown at bottom left) for agreed evidence-based and
cost-effective treatments, rather than through restricting provider supply as at present (top right); and (ii) to maintain the safety and quality and
quality of medical work through employer- and/or insurer-led audit of relevant clinical indicators (top left) rather than relying upon adherence to
centrally-administered educational programmes as currently practised (bottom right).
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excluded unsafe workers, and could even foster an illusion
that all CGS-approved medical immigrants are equally
competent.
Phantom of the AHPRA
The recent history of regulation in Australia illustrates the
difficulties many countries are experiencing as national
health bureaucracies continue to expand. A Council of
Australian Governments (COAG) agreement in 2006 led
to the establishment of a national scheme for registration
and training of the health workforce following recommen-
dations made by the Productivity Committee examining
supply and demand in the health workforce. Ironically,
given what followed, the mandate for the COAG agree-
ment was based on the simplification of processes that a
national scheme was expected to bring.
The result was not a more streamlined system, as it
turned out, but an enlarged bureaucracy - the Australian
Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) - with
redoubled authority to regulate the health workforce. To
this end AHPRA was empowered to create de novo
statutory standards for the healthcare professions, which
it has so far done in relation to continuing professional
development (CPD) and recency of practice. Yet by early
2011 a Senate Inquiry had been launched into the ‘chaos’,
‘massive delays’ and ‘bunglings’ of AHPRA, which had
erroneously blocked registration renewals for thousands
of medical practitioners; the shadow Minister for Health
called the situation ‘the height of incompetence’, while
even the conservative Australian Medical Association
condemned AHPRA’s debut as a ‘debacle’ [32].In hindsight, such errors are unsurprising. There could
hardly have been more conducive circumstances to a
fiasco than those relating to this new national scheme
which overnight brought into existence an expanded un-
elected bureaucracy with massive discretionary powers.
AHPRA provided little justification for its failings in its
evidence to the Senate Inquiry, and the anonymous offi-
cials responsible for the affair never defended their
actions; indeed, AHPRA couched its responses in self-
congratulatory terms which denied that anything very
much had gone wrong at all (AHPRA Media Release 24
March 2011; AHPRA Submission to the Senate Inquiry 14
April 2011). Such behaviour is typical of a Weberian bur-
eaucracy, which maximises its power by the application of
rules with little regard to the justification for which such
rules were originally designed [33].
The ‘brain drain’
A further example of the inflexibility of the present regu-
latory system relates to the net emigration of physicians
from first-world countries between 1960 and 1980, partly
in response to disillusionment with stifling overregulation
[34]; a bureaucratic readjustment eventually reversing this
trend occurred a decade later [35]. A similar professional
exodus has since occurred amongst South African physi-
cians for political reasons, and among Filipino nurses for
economic reasons [36], illustrating the fluidity with which
healthcare workforce skills may be transferred across bor-
ders in the globalising age [37].
It is not surprising that such high professional mobility
also has its problems. For example, migrant health pro-
fessionals remain vulnerable to sudden reversals of
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trained staff often face official barriers in gaining em-
ployment at anywhere near their pre-migration skills
level, often ending up in relatively menial or junior roles
[40]; while oscillations of national workforce oversupply
and shortage are further complicated by migration fluxes
[41,42]. The latter issue is politically delicate, involving
as it often does the movement of health professionals
from poorer to richer countries, leaving the former more
in need [43]. At first glance this latter problem would
appear to create a moral imperative for developed-world
regulators to restrict the registration of incoming health-
care workers. But the reality is more complex [44]; some
developing countries have developed a successful indus-
try in training and exporting nurses, for example, gener-
ating a valuable influx of foreign capital back to the
national economy [36]. The ethics of healthcare worker
migration thus need to be considered not only in med-
ical skills terms, but also against the broader socioeco-
nomic background [45].
Discussion
To expedite the safe yet efficient migration of foreign
(-resident or -qualified) healthcare workers, an inter-
nationally accessible database of current work-related
complaints and past (upheld) offences is one quality
control measure which could be created. A national
Register for this purpose could be accessed by potential
foreign employers on being granted permission by the
job candidate in question; in support of this proposal’s
credibility, it has been noted that a significant propor-
tion of malpractising health practitioners are repeat
offenders [46]. If a practitioner in country A has an un-
resolved complaint against his/her name, an employer in
country B would have options either (i) to delay, or de-
cide against, granting a contract, (ii) to offer a contract
in which continuation was conditional upon dismissal of
the complaint, or (iii) having been given the details ofTable 1 Revised functions of national medical Boards in a ma
Ongoing responsibilities of national regulatory Boards within a
market-based system
Recognition of the validity of training or experience represented by
degrees or qualifications conferred locally or elsewhere
Maintaining a national register of qualified practitioners, who pay a
nominal initial fee (only) for that service
Investigation of complaints involving professional misconduct, with the
power to suspend or disqualify a practitioner from registered status if
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt
Developing mechanisms to ensure that practitioners do not over-service
the patient community to an extent that is cost-ineffective, e.g. by
making unfounded claims or otherwise creating excess demand
Building transparent bridges with international regulatory partners by
developing accessible online databases of complaints and disciplinary
procedural outcomesthe complaint, to consider the relevance in country B of
the complaint lodged in country A (e.g., the Hong Kong
Medical Council has not allowed medical practitioners
to quote Ph.D. degrees without going through a formal
Council pre-approval process, whereas most other na-
tional Councils have no objection to this).
Representatives of Royal Colleges and other profes-
sional bodies have long argued the need for credentialing
to be the responsibility of clinicians rather than of gov-
ernment. In the light of this debate, it is easy to under-
stand the desire of both parties to control CPD
requirements and/or license revalidation. Yet the peren-
nial issues surrounding CPD - not only who should
regulate it, but also how much should be carried out
over what period, how it should be assessed, whether it
should be linked to license renewal, and (above all)
whether it actually achieves its stated justification of
substantively improving patient safety - could be simpli-
fied by an employer-led model of contracts and liability.
Such a system would fit the common purpose of em-
ployer and employee to maintain competence and safety;
the benchmarks by which employers and employees
monitor practice could be mutually agreed, strengthen-
ing audit via emphasis on meaningful clinical indicators
rather than on educational marking schemes of pre-
sumed but unproven value, Indeed, to the best of our
knowledge, the value of post-licensing education has
never been proven in any context; for example, post-
licence driver education has been reported to be inef-
fective in reducing car accidents [47]. These and other
suggestions for change to the status quo are summarised
in Table 1.
Summary
Bureaucracies have important benefits when first ap-
plied, such as the imposition of rule-based systems and
employee protection. Such benefits tend to atrophy over
time, however, being replaced by an expansionary culturerket-based regulatory system
Terminated powers of national regulatory Boards within a
market-based system
Prevention of well-qualified candidates accepting job offers agreeable to
informed local medical employers and insurers
Charging practitioners high annual fees solely in return for official
permission to continue practising
Blocking registration for well-qualified practitioners with no track record
of proven misconduct, for no reason other than that a filed complaint
has not yet been evaluated by another Board
Making continued professional practice contingent upon costly and
time-consuming compliance with prescribed educational activities of
assumed but unproven relation to medical competence or public safety
Invoking notions of privacy and confidentiality, in any setting, as a means
of maintaining opacity and non-accountability, whether to the profession
itself or to the public
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nomic strains that result. Indeed, many countries are
already moving their public medical systems away from
bureaucracy-dominated models, and towards more
market-sensitive cultures working together with clinical
governance [48]. We submit that an optimal compromise
between the recognised societal shortcomings of market-
based systems [49] and the logistic failings of bureaucracy-
dominated systems can be best maintained in the
healthcare sector, as in other sectors, by a more dynamic
balance of supply-and-demand forces on the one hand and
electorally-guided legal reforms on the other [50].
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